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Researcher plants 2m canaries into the AI supply chain. A privacy disaster surfaced.

November 21, 2026 Development Source: Ars Technica

Researcher plants 2m canaries into the AI supply chain. A privacy disaster surfaced.

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The findings are striking. They included: “We sent nearly two million AI prompts containing unique, trackable secrets to AI providers, then watched where those secrets surfaced,” Moore, the chief research officer of security firm Dragos, wrote Thursday. “What we found revealed security breaches, prompt theft, and widespread failures to protect customer data.” Although prompts are encrypted in transit, they are decrypted at each hop inside the large inference reseller network. The prompt is first sent to an AI router, which reads the plaintext in it to determine the most suitable inference providers to handle the request. Often, the prompt is then sent to a pool of available models, which sometimes run inside different hosting providers. Prompts can also pass from one AI router (such as Vercel) to another one (e.g. OpenRouter). Each one of these players is likely to log the prompt and store it for as long as its policies call for (if not indefinitely). Secrets sent to two of the hacked providers were quickly used together, almost immediately, from the same rented server. That means the providers were almost certainly compromised by the same adversary. As noted earlier, some of the secrets were stolen by the resellers themselves. To lure prompts to their servers, they offered low prices. Then they turned on request logging, and waited. Moore identified them by sending requests to the same model through different sellers. When credentials were later reused when sent through one seller and not another, the researcher knew it was the reseller, not the model provider, that was responsible. Last, the canary experiment revealed that some providers are scraping secret URLs put into the prompts, in violation of privacy terms. Moore wrote: The clearest example involves a Chinese AI lab. This lab’s systems fetched the secret URLs from more than half of the prompts that we sent to its models between July and October, including roughly two-thirds of the requests marked as “no data collection” or Zero Data Retention. The scraper typically showed up two or three days after the request. This wasn’t limited to requests sent to the lab directly. Several US hosting providers resell this lab’s models, and prompts sent to those providers triggered the exact same scraper—the prompts were flowing back to the lab. A customer who picked a US provider specifically to keep their data in the U.S. didn’t get what they paid for. Later on, a git client on a different cloud started trying to clone the private repositories referenced in our prompts, but only for prompts that used this lab’s models. The researcher said he found one US hosting provider crawling a secret URL more than two months after it was used in a single inference call to its search endpoint. Another ran a scraper that came back for URLs days after each request, regardless of the AI router used to reach it. Moore said that the most effective means for preventing leakage is to host models using on-premises servers. That option is expensive, though. For those who can’t afford a self-hosted system, the next best option, Moore said, is to receive service directly from a first-tier provider that provides “one contract and a privacy policy to read.” Moore said that even then, there’s no guarantee no data will leak, but that the measure minimizes the chances. AI users should also avoid accepting default provider or reseller pools and instead pick upstream providers themselves. The blockbuster research is the latest indictment exposing the lax privacy and security that’s endemic in much of the AI ecosystem. The findings mean that people who want to ensure secrets they put into prompts stay private face a daunting task that isn’t likely to become easier any time soon.