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UEFI bootkit infected fully patched Windows machines. Is Microsoft to blame?

November 3, 2026 Development Source: Ars Technica

UEFI bootkit infected fully patched Windows machines. Is Microsoft to blame?

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What makes BlackLotus and BlackX so valuable to attackers is that they execute early in the boot process, allowing them to load malicious drivers into the Windows kernel before many OS and security defenses are running. UEFI bootkits can be difficult to detect without specialized security tools and may survive an OS reinstallation if the infected boot partition remains intact. While bootkits require attackers to first compromise a device, they are particularly valuable because they combine stealth, persistence, and extensive control over the OS. The discovery of BlackLotus marked a major milestone because it transformed bootkits that bypassed Secure Boot from a theoretical threat to a real one. The ability of BlackX to achieve the same feat is similarly notable. “This patch deployment practice creates a problem—as it is extremely unusual for a system administrator to take extra steps after installing an update,” a researcher from Kaspersky, the security firm that discovered the BlackX infections, wrote recently. “Usually, when applying patches, system administrators take no further action unless an installation failure occurs. These instructions for activating the patch are buried deep on the Microsoft website, and we assess that they are quite hard for an average IT administrator to notice.” A Microsoft representative said in an email that the company is advising customers to follow guidance in this Knowledge Base post published two weeks ago. Nowhere in it, though, does Microsoft warn that the patches released to date do nothing to protect customers from Baton Drop attacks. As Kaspersky notes, Microsoft leaves out that after installing the patches, most administrators must take an additional action described in this 2023 Knowledge Base article. (It’s not clear from this article what the status is for home Windows users.) The BlackX incident underscores the difficult balancing act Microsoft must perform. Revoke the key before the new one has been installed, and a machine becomes little more than an expensive paperweight. Allow the old patch to be trusted for four years and counting, and successful exploitation is almost inevitable. The middle ground, it would seem, would be for Microsoft to be more explicit about the risks that result when the 2011 certificate isn’t manually revoked. Last week’s Knowledge Base article would have been an ideal place to do that, very possibly to the benefit of threat actors. “It is likely that the threat actor behind this campaign took into account that few organizations realized the importance of manually activating the Baton Drop patch,” Kaspersky said. “As such, we believe they decided to invest time in understanding how BlackLotus works and creating a copycat of this bootkit.”